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RENEWING THE VAGUENESS CHALLENGE TO
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
Melissa London*
Abstract: Noncitizens who have been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude”
(CIMT) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) can be deported. However, the INA
fails to provide a definition for “moral turpitude” or a list of crimes that necessarily involve
“moral turpitude.” As a result, judges are given wide discretion to decide when a crime is
morally reprehensible enough to render a noncitizen deportable. This moral determination in
the CIMT analysis has led to disparate results among the lower courts, which deprives
noncitizens of meaningful notice of what conduct could render them deportable. In 1951, the
Supreme Court held in Jordan v. De George that the phrase “crimes involving moral turpitude”
was not unconstitutionally vague. This decision left the moral turpitude provisions intact in the
INA, though still undefined.
While the Jordan decision remains untouched, the CIMT analysis has drastically evolved.
Under the current framework, judges across the country reach disparate results on whether
certain crimes necessarily involve moral turpitude, and noncitizens pay the price of the ensuing
arbitrary results. Regulatory crimes pose particular difficulties in applying the current CIMT
analysis. Even though some courts have reasoned regulatory crimes are typically not crimes
involving moral turpitude, other courts have held the opposite. This discrepancy is notable with
respect to a recent circuit split over whether failure to register as a sex offender is a CIMT. The
revival and expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the increasing uncertainty over
CIMT analysis—shown chiefly through sex offender registration statutes—creates an
opportunity to revisit the vagueness challenge to the CIMT provision in the INA seventy years
since it was first heard by the Court. Accordingly, the current framework for analyzing whether
a crime involves moral turpitude under the INA should be rendered void-for-vagueness under
the Due Process Clause.

INTRODUCTION
The United States immigration system is a complex scheme that is
unlike any other area of the law because it blurs the line between civil
proceedings and criminal punishments. As a sovereign nation, the United
States has the power to choose who it lets into the country and under what
circumstances.1 This power is reserved to Congress as the primary
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. Thank you to Professor
Angélica Cházaro and Professor Haiyun Damon-Feng for their thoughtful and detailed guidance on
my Comment. I would also like to thank the editors of Washington Law Review for their time and
dedication in working on my piece, especially my Notes and Comments editors Kayla Ganir, Caroline
Sung, Kyung Sun Park, and Luke Sturgeon.
1. See, e.g., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (holding that Congress determines how
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regulator of the immigration system.2 Congress’s power is plenary,
meaning its decisions are often final and outside the scope of judicial
review.3 The primary way Congress regulates immigration is through the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).4 Since its enactment in 1952, the
INA has evolved through amendments and changes in United States
immigration policy.5
While commentators point to many problematic provisions in the INA,
one that continues to perplex legal scholars and judges alike is the
codification of “crime involving moral turpitude”6 (CIMT).7 Although
this phrase has been around for over a century, it has never been formally
defined by either Congress or the courts.8 A noncitizen9 may be deported
much process is due for individuals subject to exclusion from the United States); Fong v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) (finding that allowing a “foreigner” into the United States is a “matter
of pure permission, of simple tolerance, and creates no obligation”).
2. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial review
as part of the judicial branch), with Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581 (1889) (establishing the plenary power doctrine, which protects Congress’s immigration
decisions from judicial review).
3. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (“The authority to control
immigration—to admit or exclude [noncitizens]—is vested solely in the Federal Government.”)
(quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)). Scholars have expounded on the uniqueness of
plenary power over immigration law. For a more in-depth analysis, see generally David A. Martin,
Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015); Hiroshimi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992), reprinted in 14 IMMIGR. & NAT’Y L. REV. 3
(1992); and Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458 (2009).
4. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 153 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537);
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/lawsand-policy/legislation/immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/2DG8-4ZMJ].
5. Many of the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability in the INA have been frequently
amended with new categories based on which groups of people Congress intended to exclude at
different points in history. See Legislation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/legislation [https://perma.cc/8D94-YXP8] (“Congress has
amended the INA many times based on new public laws.”).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
7. DAVID WEISSBRODT, LAURA DANIELSON & HOWARD S. MYERS, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 267 (7th ed. 2017) (“Although the term has been used in immigration
law since 1891, possibly the most difficult criminal ground to define is the ‘crime involving moral
turpitude.’”); see also Craig S. Lerner, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: The Constitutional and
Persistent Immigration Law Doctrine, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2021).
8. See infra section I.B.
9. This Comment uses the term “noncitizen” rather than “alien,” which is the term that appears in
the INA. Recently, President Joe Biden proposed an immigration reform bill that would remove the
term “alien” from U.S. immigration laws, replacing it with “noncitizen” in an effort to move away
from the dehumanizing term. See Nicole Acevedo, Biden Seeks to Replace ‘Alien’ with Less
‘Dehumanizing Term’ in Immigration Laws, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021, 12:34 PM),
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if an immigration judge determines the crime they committed involves
moral turpitude,10 without regard for the noncitizen’s actual conduct.11
Offenses that have been considered CIMTs range from passing a bad
check12 to murder.13
Even though it is essential to provide noncitizens with notice of what
conduct could be considered a CIMT, the current framework for
evaluating whether a crime involves moral turpitude does not lead to
uniform results. Judges must decide whether a crime is a CIMT without a
clear definition to follow, which permits their personal and moral beliefs
to influence the outcome. This leads to disparate results.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) attempted to create
uniformity across the courts via a framework for lower courts to use in
determining whether a crime constitutes a CIMT under the INA.14
However, this Comment argues the framework ultimately enables
arbitrary enforcement of the INA’s CIMT provisions and fails to
meaningfully warn noncitizens of what conduct could render them
deportable.
This arbitrary enforcement and lack of notice leads some judges and
legal scholars to suggest the CIMT provisions are unconstitutional under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.15 The concept of vagueness is derived
from the Due Process Clause16 of the United States Constitution and
requires statutes to provide fair notice in order to avoid arbitrary
enforcement of the laws.17 The Supreme Court previously weighed in on

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/biden-seeks-replace-alien-less-dehumanizing-termimmigration-laws-n1255350 [https://perma.cc/RFD5-283E].
10. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
11. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration Beyond the Headlines: The Board of Immigration
Appeals’ Quiet Expansion of the Meaning of Moral Turpitude, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 267, 267
(2019) [hereinafter Koh, Crimmigration Beyond the Headlines].
12. See Dolic v. Barr, 916 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2019).
13. See United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90
NEB. L. REV. 647 (2012) (arguing that the CIMT provision in the INA is unconstitutionally vague and
should be replaced by a clear definition from Congress); Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1004–05 (“The few scholarly articles on the [CIMT] standard, almost all
in immigration law, have argued, in agreement, that it is unconstitutionally vague and invites
inconsistent and unpredictable judgments.”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the phrase “moral turpitude” because it had “no sufficiently
definite meaning to be a constitutional standard for deportation”).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See Roger A. Fairfax & John C. Harrison, The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, NAT’L
CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendmentv/clauses/633 [https://perma.cc/VE3Y-BZAA].
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a vagueness challenge to CIMTs in 1951 in Jordan v. De George.18 In that
case, the Court held the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” was not
unconstitutionally vague.19 The majority reasoned that even if it is
difficult to determine whether “certain marginal offenses” are CIMTs, that
“does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional . . . .”20
Although the CIMT framework has evolved over the last seventy years
since Jordan, the same critiques of the phrase “crimes involving moral
turpitude” exist: the current CIMT framework continues to enable
arbitrary enforcement by permitting judges to make moral determinations,
thus failing to provide notice to noncitizens contrary to the requirements
of the Due Process Clause.21 However, the Supreme Court appears to be
expanding the void-for-vagueness doctrine as shown through three recent
decisions.22 This expansion could allow for a renewed vagueness
challenge notwithstanding the Jordan decision. Challenging the CIMT
provisions is important given the clearly unpredictable nature of the
current CIMT analysis.23
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief overview
of the immigration system, focusing on the treatment of noncitizens in
removal proceedings and evaluating the differences in procedural
safeguards afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings versus
respondents in immigration proceedings. This Part also introduces the
CIMT provisions and discusses issues in defining “moral turpitude.”
Part II outlines the history of the CIMT analysis, including the BIA’s
attempt at creating a uniform framework through three decisions: SilvaTrevino I,24 Silva-Trevino II,25 and Silva-Trevino III.26 Part III discusses
the impact of the current CIMT framework set forth in Silva-Trevino III.
Part III also introduces a circuit split regarding sex offender registration
statutes to further emphasize the difficulties of applying the CIMT
analysis due to the influence of moral judgments. Part IV provides a brief
primer on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which forms the basis of the
solution ultimately posed in this Comment, and summarizes a recent
expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in three Supreme Court

18. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
19. Id. at 231–32.
20. Id. at 231.
21. See Fairfax & Harrison, supra note 17.
22. See infra section IV.C.
23. See infra Part III.
24. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Att’y Gen. 2015).
25. 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014).
26. 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016).
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cases: Johnson v. United States,27 Sessions v. Dimaya,28 and United States
v. Davis.29 Finally, Part V sets forth a renewed vagueness challenge in
light of the current difficulty of applying the CIMT framework and the
Court’s purported expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Challenging the CIMT framework as void-for-vagueness is necessary to
curb the unpredictable and disparate effect on noncitizens.
I.

THE TREATMENT OF NONCITIZENS WITHIN THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM

Immigration law is uniquely situated in between civil and criminal law
in many respects. This overlap between the civil and criminal systems is
considered by legal scholars to be the “criminalization of immigration
law,”30 often referred to as “crimmigration.”31 This Comment focuses on
one particular point of intersection between the two systems: removal of
noncitizens. For purposes of this Comment, the term “noncitizen” refers
to individuals who were properly admitted into the country but have been
alleged to have committed a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT),
which is a deportable offense.32 However, the INA does not define what
constitutes a CIMT, so courts are left to sort out the definition on their
own. Moreover, a noncitizen alleged to have committed a CIMT lacks
many of the procedural safeguards afforded to defendants in criminal
proceedings because immigration proceedings are civil.33
A.

Removal Proceedings
Congress has the power to regulate immigration,34 which includes not

27. 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
28. __ U.S. __,138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
29. __ U.S. __,139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
30. Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New
Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 616 (2003).
31. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 367, 378 (2006).
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). There are many other grounds of deportation listed in the INA.
See id. § 1227(a)(2) (listing the criminal offenses that can render a noncitizen deportable). This
Comment focuses only on the provisions regarding crimes involving moral turpitude.
33. See generally Two Systems of Justice, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 2013),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aic_twosystemsofjustice.p
df [https://perma.cc/5SZ7-RQD7] [hereinafter Two Systems of Justice].
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power to . . . establish [a] uniform Rule of
Naturalization . . . .”); Chapter 3: USCIS Authority to Naturalize, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-a-chapter-3 [https://perma.cc/J38EMFRM].
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only deciding the classes of people permitted to enter the country, but also
the circumstances under which people are no longer allowed to stay in the
country.35 Pursuant to its authority under the INA, Congress set forth
numerous grounds of deportability that can trigger removal proceedings.36
Removal proceedings are used to determine “the inadmissibility or
deportability of [a noncitizen].”37 The Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) oversees these proceedings.38 The EOIR comprises fiftyeight administrative immigration courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).39 The BIA is “the highest administrative body for
interpreting and applying immigration laws.”40
Once the government believes a noncitizen may be deportable,41 they
are issued a “Notice to Appear,” which initiates removal proceedings.42
They are then referred to an immigration judge.43 The immigration judge
has full discretion to determine whether the noncitizen is removable based

35. See Fong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The right to exclude or to expel all
[noncitizens], or any class of [noncitizens] . . . being an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation . . . .”).
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2) (“[A noncitizen] placed in proceedings under this section may be
charged with any applicable . . . ground of deportability under section 1227(a) of this title.”); see also
id. § 1227.
37. Id. § 1229a(a)(1). Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) in 1996, removal proceedings were triggered based on whether a person had entered the
country or not. If a noncitizen had not entered the country, then they were subject to exclusion,
whereas a noncitizen who entered the country was subject to deportation. Now, both processes are
encompassed by removal proceedings, but rather than focusing on entry, the inquiry instead hinges
on admission. WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 7, at 267; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The
terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to [a noncitizen], the lawful entry of the
[noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”).
38. See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10150, IMMIGRATION LAWS REGULATING THE
ADMISSION
AND
EXCLUSION
OF
ALIENS
AT
THE
BORDER
1
(2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10150 (last visited May 1, 2022).
39. Chapter 3: The Immigration Court System, KIDS IN NEEDS OF DEFENSE,
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Chapter-3-The-Immigration-Court-System.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VTM-NDAB].
40. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/T9E2-QRY8].
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
42. Executive Office for Immigration Review: An Agency Guide, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2 (Dec. 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download [https://perma.cc/NM4AGXGL]; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (“In removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title,
written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given in person to the
[noncitizen] . . . .”).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the
inadmissibility or deportability of [a noncitizen].”); Colleen Muñoz, Reevaluating the Adjudication
of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 325, 336 (2020).
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on the evidence presented at the hearing.44 The noncitizen may appeal the
ruling to the BIA.45 If the BIA issues the noncitizen a final order of
removal, they can appeal again through a petition for review in a federal
court of appeals in the circuit where their case was originally filed.46
Even when a case is appealed to a circuit court, the BIA’s prior
published decisions will have precedential value if they are designated as
such. 47 Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,48 an administrative body’s decision must be followed unless
it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”49 In the
context of immigration law, the Supreme Court determined that “the BIA
is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the
INA.”50 The Court reasoned that because Congress charged the Attorney
General with administering the INA, and the Attorney General in turn
delegated the power to determine cases to the BIA, “the BIA should be
accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms
‘concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’”51
Therefore, when a noncitizen’s conviction is evaluated under the CIMT
analysis, the court will first look to decisions from the BIA to see whether
the conduct at issue had been previously ruled on.52 This differs from other
areas of the law where federal courts need only defer to Supreme Court

44. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A). Additionally, the immigration judge is not constrained by any
evidentiary barriers because the rules of evidence do not apply to removal proceedings. See Two
Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 7.
45. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2022); Fact Sheet: Immigration Courts, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Aug. 7,
2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-immigration-courts/ [https://perma.cc/G7FQKS9R].
46. Fact Sheet: Immigration Courts, supra note 45.
47. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2022); see also Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in
Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 505 (2018).
48. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
49. Id. at 844. Federal courts follow a two-step process to determine whether the agency’s decision
is entitled to deference. First, the court looks to the plain language of the statute to determine whether
it is ambiguous. Id. at 842–43. If the language is deemed ambiguous, then the court must determine
whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 843–44. So long as the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable and based “on a permissible construction of the statute,” the court must
defer to the agency’s interpretation. Id. at 843; see Jennifer Safstrom, An Analysis of the Applications
and Implications of Chevron Deference in Immigration, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 53, 54 (2019).
50. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009). However, there is an ongoing debate among
scholars about whether Chevron deference does and should apply in the immigration context. See,
e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron Deference in
Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021) (discussing the debate over Chevron deference
in immigration law).
51. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
52. Muñoz, supra note 43, at 337.

London (Do Not Delete)

588

6/21/22 11:02 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:581

decisions.53
Removal proceedings seek to remove two types of individuals:
(1) those who were not properly admitted into the country and are
therefore inadmissible;54 and (2) those who were properly admitted into
the country but have since committed a deportable offense.55 This
Comment focuses only on the latter category of individuals who were
properly admitted into the country but became removable upon
committing a deportable offense—specifically by violating one of the
CIMT provisions.
Even if a noncitizen is authorized to live in the United States—for
example, as a lawful permanent resident (LPR)—they can still be
deported.56 LPRs are potentially subject to removal proceedings because
they are not United States citizens.57 Thus, even after going through the
onerous process of becoming an LPR and obtaining a green card58 with
the intent to remain in the United States permanently, LPRs can be subject
to deportation if they are found to have committed a deportable offense.59
Under the INA, the listed grounds of deportability are not subject to statute
of limitations.60 To avoid the possibility of deportation, noncitizens can
apply for naturalization under the INA to become United States citizens.61
53. See, e.g., Henderson v. Collins, 262 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the court is
bound by decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States and must defer to its prior decisions
unless there are “material distinctions”).
54. Individuals can be deemed inadmissible for a variety of reasons, such as entering without
inspection or not having the correct documentation when attempting to cross at a border. See EWI:
Entry Without Inspection, FINDLAW (May 14, 2020), https://www.findlaw.com/immigration/
deportation-removal/ewi-entry-without-inspection.html [https://perma.cc/4DLC-999C]; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (explaining expedited removal).
55. Both of these categories fall under the same removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
56. Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanent-residents
[https://perma.cc/J8MC2Y8V] [hereinafter Lawful Permanent Residents].
57. See id.; Cancellation of Removal, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/cancellation_of_removal [https://perma.cc/U5C7-YPHZ]
58. Lawful Permanent Residents, supra note 56.
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
60. See Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 3.
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (detailing the requirements for naturalization). It is important to note that
the process of applying for naturalization may in and of itself be the trigger for deportation
proceedings if it is discovered in the background review that the noncitizen committed a deportable
offense. See Ilona Bray, Risks of Applying for Naturalized U.S. Citizenship: Denial or Even
Deportation, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/who-should-not-apply-naturalizedus-citizenship-without-talking-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/N3MF-6ACK]. Even after being
naturalized, a noncitizen could be denaturalized for either “illegal procurement of naturalization” or
procuring naturalization by “concealing a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” See Fact
Sheet
on
Denaturalization,
NAT’L
IMMIGR.
F.
(Oct.
2,
2018),
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If a noncitizen meets certain eligibility requirements62 they can become a
United States citizen and cannot thereafter be removed from the country.63
Congress codified the list of deportable offenses in section 237 of the
INA.64 For example, committing marriage fraud or being convicted of an
aggravated felony are deportable offenses.65 If a court finds a noncitizen
committed a deportable offense during removal proceedings,66 they are
subject to deportation and can be barred from reentering the United
States.67
Because immigration law is civil, removal proceedings are
characterized as civil proceedings. 68 This can be counterintuitive given
that removal proceedings are often triggered by the alleged criminal
conduct of a noncitizen. Nevertheless, in the 1893 decision of Fong v.
United States,69 the Supreme Court determined that deportation is a civil
sanction rather than a criminal punishment.70 At the time of that decision,
the process of deporting a noncitizen was thought to be more of an
administrative mechanism by which a person is returned to their native
country.71 However, this theory of deportation was not unanimously
accepted. Justice Brewer dissented in Fong, arguing that deportation
“deprives [noncitizens] of liberty, and imposes punishment, without due
process of law, and in disregard of constitutional guaranties.”72
Justice Brewer’s dissent gained traction in the following decades.
Nearly a half century later, a majority opinion restated the notion that

https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-on-denaturalization/
[https://perma.cc/HBN2FNQF]. If a noncitizen was naturalized and later denaturalized, they could theoretically be removed
if required under the INA. Id.
62. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 316.2.
63. Lawful Permanent Residents, supra note 56. However, it is theoretically possible for a person
to be denaturalized.
64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
65. See id. §§ 1227(a)(1)(G), (a)(2)(A)(iii).
66. See id. § 1229a(a).
67. See Can You Return to the U.S. After Being Deported?, ALLLAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/us-immigration/can-you-return-after-being-deported.html
[https://perma.cc/9DHD-PH72]. The bar on reentry for a noncitizen that has been deported can last
as few as five years up to a permanent bar on ever being able to reenter the country. Id.
68. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 11.
69. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The Chinese laborers had been living in the United States but failed to
apply for a certificate of residence under the Act of 1892. They were subsequently arrested and subject
to expulsion (what would now be called deportation). Id. at 718–19.
70. See id. at 730 (“The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment,
in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way
of punishment.”).
71. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 2.
72. Fong, 149 U.S. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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deportation is a form of severe punishment. In Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,73
Justice Douglas concluded that “deportation is a drastic measure and at
times the equivalent of banishment or exile . . . . It is the forfeiture for
misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.”74
More recently, the Court again recognized the convergence of civil and
criminal law with respect to deportation in Padilla v. Kentucky.75 In that
case, the Court held that a defendant’s counsel was “constitutionally
deficient” under the Sixth Amendment by not informing the defendant
that their plea could carry a risk of deportation.76 The Padilla decision is
significant because it “represented a groundbreaking recognition by the
highest Court . . . that for noncitizens, the constitutional right to counsel
must include advice on the immigration consequences of a criminal
case.”77 Notwithstanding the fact that removal proceedings are civil, the
Court recognized that the risk of deportation is so severe that the
Constitution requires a defense attorney inform criminal defendants of the
potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea.
B.

Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude

The largest category of deportable offenses in the INA is criminal
offenses.78 This category includes general crimes, controlled substances,
certain firearm offenses, miscellaneous crimes, crimes of domestic
violence, and trafficking.79 A noncitizen who commits a crime under any
of these provisions is automatically deportable.80 One of the offenses
73. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
74. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
75. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
76. Id. at 374.
77. Manny Vargas, Ten Years Later, Fulfilling the Promise of Padilla v. Kentucky, IMMIGRANT
DEF. PROJECT, https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/ten-years-later-fulfilling-the-promise-ofpadilla-v-kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/3R4Q-2Q9Z].
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
79. See id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)–(F).
80. See id. § 1227(a) (“Any [noncitizen] in and admitted to the United States shall . . . be removed
if the [noncitizen] is within one or more of the following classes of deportable [noncitizens] . . . .”
(emphasis added)). If found to have committed one of these offenses, deportation is mandatory
because of the use of the word “shall.” This differs from other provisions in the INA, such as
detention, where Congress used the word “may” to designate that detention is permitted, but not
mandatory. See, e.g., id. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, [a noncitizen] may
be arrested and detained . . . .” (emphasis added)). However, it is necessary to distinguish between an
individual committing a deportable offense and the individual actually being deported. Even if an
individual is found to have committed a deportable offense, they may still qualify for forms of relief.
See generally EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FACT SHEET: FORMS OF RELIEF
FROM
REMOVAL
(2004),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/
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listed in the general crimes category of the INA is a “crime involving
moral turpitude” (CIMT).81 The INA provides the following language:
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude
Any [noncitizen] who—
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committedwithin five years . . . after the date of admission, and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed,
is deportable.82
This provision triggers deportation if a noncitizen is convicted of one
CIMT within five years of being admitted to the United States. However,
the five-year time limit only applies in this particular provision. The
subsequent provision in the INA provides an additional ground of
deportation for a noncitizen found to have committed two or more CIMTs
at any time in their life:
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions
Any [noncitizen] who at any time after admission is convicted of
two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of
a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether
confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were
in a single trial, is deportable.83
The BIA held that for crimes to fall within a “single scheme,” the
crimes “must take place at one time, meaning that there must be no
substantial interruption that would allow the participant to disassociate
himself from his enterprise and reflect on what he has done.”84 However,
the BIA did not instruct courts on how to exactly define the necessary
temporal restriction; thus, the “single scheme” exception is incredibly
narrow.85 Accordingly, an immigration judge can determine that two
crimes from the same police report, criminal complaint, or plea colloquy

legacy/2004/08/05/ReliefFromRemoval.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP56-XVHH] (discussing different
forms of relief from removal, including voluntary departure, cancellation of removal, and asylum—
which are forms of discretionary relief—and motions to reopen or reconsider, stay of removal,
administrative appeal, and judicial relief—which are forms of administrative and judicial relief).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
84. Saiful Islam, 25 I. & N. Dec. 637, 640 (B.I.A. 2011) (quoting Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506,
509–10 (B.I.A. 1992)).
85. KATHY BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., ALL THOSE RULES ABOUT CRIMES INVOLVING
MORAL
TURPITUDE
8
(2020),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/
all_those_rules_cimt_june_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GZE-D9XX].
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did not arise from a single scheme of misconduct.86
Congress does not define what constitutes a CIMT within these
provisions or anywhere else in the INA.87 Congress also does not provide
a list of offenses considered to be CIMTs anywhere in the INA.88 This
differs from other categories of general crimes where the INA provides a
clear definition of the offense, such as “aggravated felony.”89 Without a
clear definition to follow, the INA leaves it to judges to decide which
crimes necessarily involve moral turpitude and accordingly render a
noncitizen deportable for committing a CIMT. As a result, even a
misdemeanor conviction could result in mandatory deportation for a
noncitizen.90
A historical evaluation of the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude”
provides little insight to creating a concrete definition for courts and
judges to consistently apply. The phrase “moral turpitude” first appeared
in the Immigration Act of 189191 as a ground of exclusion, but was
adopted “without comment.”92 CIMTs became a ground of deportation in
the Immigration Act of 1917,93 but again Congress did not include a
definition.94 The legislative history of that provision suggests that
Congress believed a CIMT constituted a “serious offense.”95
Without a statutory definition to follow, courts must come up with their
own definitions, which leads to disparate and varied outcomes.96 Courts
commonly look to Black’s Law Dictionary to glean an understanding of
“moral turpitude.”97 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “moral turpitude,” in
part, as “[c]onduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality.”98 The

86. Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV.
1127, 1180 [hereinafter Koh, Void for Vagueness].
87. See Pooja R. Dadhania, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After
Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 315 (2011).
88. See Simon Y. Svirnovskiy, Finding a Right to Remain: Immigration, Deportation, and Due
Process, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 32, 41 (2017).
89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); id. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (describing different crimes that
are considered by the INA as aggravated felonies).
90. Muñoz, supra note 43, at 331.
91. Pub. L. No. 51-551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
92. Holper, supra note 15, at 649–50.
93. See Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 19, 39 Stat. 974 (1917).
94. Holper, supra note 15, at 651.
95. Id.; see also 2 HON. J. HOWARD MCGRATH, THOMAS G. FINUCANE & WATSON B. MILLER,
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS UNDER IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAWS 139 (1944) (discussing
the reports preceding the 1917 Act that included reference to “serious crimes”).
96. See infra section II.B.
97. Dadhania, supra note 87, at 318–19.
98. Moral Turpitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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notion of morality is also present in the underpinnings of immigration law
in the United States as a whole: the original purpose of the INA was to
delineate between “desirable” and “undesirable” people so that only those
who were considered desirable were allowed into the country.99 As such,
the codification of CIMTs as a deportation ground reflects the prevalence
of this moral judgment in immigration law.
The BIA attempted to solidify a definition of CIMTs to help instruct
lower courts when applying the CIMT provisions against noncitizen
respondents in immigration proceedings. In several decisions, the BIA
defined CIMT as “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being
inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the
duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in
general.”100 The BIA also held that “[t]o involve moral turpitude, a crime
requires two essential elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable
mental state.”101
Even with these working definitions in mind, the task of determining
whether a crime inherently involves moral turpitude is not easy. Many
judges have observed the difficulty of pinpointing the line between
conduct that necessarily involves moral turpitude and conduct that does
not.102 Determining what crimes involve moral turpitude further
implicates other aspects of immigration law beyond deportation of
noncitizens, which are outside the scope of this Comment.103
C.

Evaluating the Lack of Procedural Safeguards Afforded to
Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings

Even though deportation is a severe consequence of removal
proceedings, a noncitizen alleged of committing a CIMT—or any other
deportable offense—does not receive many of the procedural safeguards
that are required for defendants in criminal proceedings because removal

99. GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,
H.R. JUDICIARY COMM. NO. 100–7, at 10 (1988) (“The intent of our immigration laws is not to restrict
immigration, but to sift it, to separate the desirable from the undesirable immigrants, and to permit
only those to land on our shores who have certain physical and moral qualities.”).
100. Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1989).
101. Silva-Trevino III, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 834 (B.I.A. 2016).
102. See, e.g., Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 409 (3d Cir. 2005) (calling the moral turpitude
jurisprudence an “amorphous morass”); Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner,
J., concurring) (“It’s difficult to make sense of these definitions, which approach gibberish yet are
quoted deferentially in countless modern opinions.”).
103. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (discussing cancellation of removal); id. § 1101(f)(3)
(requiring a noncitizen to establish good moral character as a prerequisite to citizenship); id.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (barring noncitizens convicted of CIMTs from obtaining visas).

London (Do Not Delete)

594

6/21/22 11:02 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:581

proceedings are civil.104 Accordingly, removal proceedings do not trigger
the constitutional protections required for criminal defendants in criminal
proceedings.105 Each proceeding is distinct with respect to the noncitizen.
For example, if a noncitizen is alleged of committing murder, they would
first be prosecuted as a criminal defendant in state court. As this Part
explains, they would receive greater constitutional protections in this
criminal proceeding. If the noncitizen is convicted of the crime of murder,
they would then be subject to removal proceedings as a noncitizen
respondent in immigration court. Because the immigration proceeding is
civil, the noncitizen respondent would receive far fewer protections than
they previously had in their criminal proceeding. In effect, this means that
noncitizens have fewer rights than criminal defendants even amidst the
recognition of the severity of deportation.106
The following sections will briefly discuss three categories of rights
that are required for defendants in criminal proceedings but not for
noncitizen respondents in immigration proceedings: (1) constitutionally
required rights; (2) Supreme Court-created rights; and (3) procedural
rights. This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to provide
a few examples of the difference in rights afforded to defendants in
criminal proceedings versus respondents in immigration proceedings.
1.

Rights Required by the Constitution

The Constitution requires different protections for respondents in
immigration proceedings than for defendants in criminal proceedings.107
This is primarily due to the fact that immigration proceedings are
governed by civil law, whereas criminal proceedings are governed by
criminal law. Respondents in removal proceedings have no constitutional
right to appointed counsel because the Sixth Amendment does not attach
to civil proceedings like it does in criminal proceedings.108 In the absence
of the Sixth Amendment, the INA also does not provide a right to counsel
for respondents. Rather, the INA states that respondents in removal
proceedings “shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense

104. See Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 1.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5; see also supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s recognition of deportation as a severe punishment).
107. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 1.
108. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43613, ALIENS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 6 (2016). But see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
(emphasis added)).
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to the Government).”109 Therefore, it is up to the respondent to find their
own attorney if they want representation during their removal
proceedings.
Securing representation largely turns on factors outside of the
respondent’s control. For example, the location of the respondent’s
removal proceedings has a significant impact on their ability to find
representation because larger cities have more attorneys available than
smaller cities.110 A lack of constitutionally-mandated appointed counsel
also requires respondents to pay for their own counsel, which poses
financial barriers to obtaining representation.111 For individuals in
removal proceedings, access to counsel can mean the difference between
a permanent bar on reentering the United States or obtaining some form
of relief from removal.112 One study conducted in 2016 found that only
thirty-seven percent of individuals were able to get legal representation
for their deportation proceedings.113
The Sixth Amendment also guarantees defendants in criminal
proceedings the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury in the
jurisdiction where the original crime was alleged to have occurred.114
However, respondents in immigration proceedings do not have the right
to a speedy trial,115 and the immigration judge, rather than a jury,
determines whether a respondent is removable.116 Furthermore,
respondents have no right to stand trial in the same jurisdiction as the
alleged offense took place.117 This primarily impacts respondents facing
removal proceedings while in detention because United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement has discretion to detain a
respondent in any jurisdiction it chooses.118 As a result, even if a

109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (emphasis added).
110. See Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 9–10.
111. See id. at 10.
112. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (providing for discretionary cancellation of removal for
certain noncitizens by the Attorney General).
113. Fact Sheet: Immigration Courts, supra note 45.
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .”).
115. See Svirnovskiy, supra note 88, at 72; Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 1.
116. See Holper, supra note 15, at 668.
117. See Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 9.
118. See BRYAN LONEGAN & THE IMMIGRATION LAW UNIT OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND REMOVAL: A GUIDE FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 8 (2006),
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/detentionremovalguide_2006-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GDG-9WA4]. This Comment will not go in depth on the treatment of individuals
in detention, but for more information, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
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respondent can obtain counsel, there is no guarantee they will not be
transferred to another jurisdiction during their removal proceedings,
which could leave them without representation.119
2.

Rights Created by the Supreme Court

In addition to constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has conferred
other procedural safeguards on criminal defendants through caselaw that
do not extend to respondents in removal proceedings. In Coffin v. United
States,120 the Supreme Court held that “[t]he principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law.”121
Therefore, criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, respondents in removal
proceedings do not receive a presumption of non-removability.122 The
Supreme Court also requires that individuals suspected of committing a
crime must be given “Miranda warnings” before they are questioned by
officers. The rights encompassed in Miranda warnings stem from the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments—namely, the right against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel.123 In Miranda v. Arizona,124 the Court reasoned that
in order for these rights to be meaningful, a person suspected of
committing a crime must be explicitly informed of their rights.125 The
Court specifically referenced these warnings as a necessary procedural
safeguard for individuals suspected of committing a crime.126 As a result
of the Court’s decision in Miranda, officers must inform persons under
arrest of their right to remain silent, that anything they say can be used
against them in a court of law, that they have the right to an attorney, and
that an attorney will be appointed if they cannot afford one.127 This
protection does not extend to noncitizens suspected of violating
immigration law prior to questioning because of the civil nature of

119. While an immigration court can transfer an individual’s case to a court closer to the
individual’s home jurisdiction, obtaining a change of venue is more difficult for people in detention.
See LONEGAN & THE IMMIGRATION LAW UNIT OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, supra note 118, at 8.
120. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
121. Id. at 453.
122. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 7.
123. See U.S. CONST. amends. X, VI.
124. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
125. Id. at 478–79.
126. Id. (“[W]e hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [their]
freedom . . . the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege . . . .”).
127. Id. at 479.
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immigration proceedings.128 Instead, noncitizens may be asked questions
that pertain directly to their alleged removability without receiving any
warning that the information can be used against them in their subsequent
immigration proceedings.129 The lack of warnings is further exacerbated
by the fact that immigration proceedings are not subject to the same rules
of evidence as criminal proceedings,130 and instead the general rule is in
favor of admissibility.131
3.

Procedural Rights Within the Courts

The structure of immigration courts also disadvantages respondents in
immigration proceedings compared to criminal defendants. In criminal
prosecutions, the judge is the neutral decision-maker and independent
from the prosecuting agency.132 Alternatively, immigration judges are
employed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), meaning they are
technically DOJ attorneys.133 As opposed to impartial judges, these
immigration judges “are subject to DOJ performance evaluations, which
emphasize case completion goals, rather than judicial standards of
conduct.”134 As a result, immigration judges have different incentives than
traditional judges.
To further complicate matters, some immigration judges do not even
have any immigration law experience.135 This poses significant problems
for proper administration of immigration proceedings due to the complex
128. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 5.
129. See, e.g., E-R-M-F- & A-S-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 580 (B.I.A. 2011) (holding that immigration
officers are not required to tell noncitizens they have the right to counsel or that statements made
during interrogation can be used against them in subsequent proceedings before the noncitizens are
placed in formal proceedings).
130. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 7, 10–11.
131. See, e.g., Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503, 505 (B.I.A. 1980) (“To be admissible in
deportation proceedings, evidence must be relevant and probative and its use must not be
fundamentally unfair.”); Zaruma-Gauman v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[S]trict rules
of evidence to not apply in immigration proceedings.” (citing Jianli Chen v. Holder, 703 F.3d 17, 23
(1st Cir. 2012))).
132. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 7.
133. Id.; see also Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV.
417, 429 (2011).
134. Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 7.
135. In early 2020, the EOIR swore in twenty-eight new immigration judges, of which eleven had
no immigration law experience. This was made possible by the fact that the job posting to fill the
immigration judge vacancies did not mention a requirement for immigration law experience. Rather,
only seven years of “post-bar experience as a licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or
appealing formal hearings or trials” was required. Nolan Rappaport, No Experience Required: U.S.
Hiring Immigration Judges Who Don’t Have Any Immigration Law Experience, HILL (Feb. 3, 2020,
11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/481152-us-hiring-immigration-judges-whodont-have-any-immigration-law-experience [https://perma.cc/SKV7-YB4R].
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and unusual nature of immigration law. In the realm of asylum-seekers,
scholars have compared the decisions made by immigration judges to that
of a “refugee roulette.”136 Similar arbitrary decisions are made in other
areas of immigration law that can influence deportation of noncitizens.137
As the next Part will discuss, the inconsistent application of the phrase
“crimes involving moral turpitude” has been argued as similarly
subjecting noncitizens “to play what amounts to a game of Russian
Roulette with their liberty.”138
As a result of these differences in constitutional and procedural rights
granted only to criminal defendants, an individual suspected of violating
an immigration law receives fewer procedural protections than an
individual suspected of violating a criminal law.139 For criminal
defendants, many of these protections are required by the Bill of Rights
and serve as “the foundation of a system of justice premised on the idea
that it is better that ten guilty persons go free than one innocent be
imprisoned.”140 In comparison, because removal is a civil process,
noncitizens are without many of these protections as respondents in
removal proceedings, which “does not reflect American values of due
process and fundamental fairness.”141
II.

PAST TO PRESENT CIMT ANALYSIS

For decades, courts have tried to find a way to consistently define
CIMTs but “have long struggled in administering and applying
the . . . moral turpitude provisions.”142 This Part begins by describing the
difficulty of using a categorical approach to determine when a crime is a
CIMT. Next, this Part explores the BIA’s attempt to develop a uniform
framework for CIMT analysis through a series of decisions: Silva-Trevino
I, Silva-Trevino II, and Silva-Trevino III.

136. Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1132. See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew
I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295 (2007).
137. Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1160 (“Extraordinary levels of arbitrariness when
it comes to discretionary decision-making in immigration cases have already been widely
documented.”).
138. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 19, Islas-Veloz v. Barr, 914 F.3d 1249 (9th
Cir. 2019) (No. 19-627), 2019 WL 7049908.
139. See Two Systems of Justice, supra note 33, at 5.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id. at 1.
142. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550
(Att’y Gen. 2015).
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The Two-Step Categorical Approach Led to Inconsistent Outcomes

Courts have used various categorical approaches throughout the recent
decades to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude.143 Prior
to 2008, courts employed a two-step categorical approach through which
the presence of moral turpitude was “determined by the nature of the
statutory offense for which the [noncitizen] was convicted, and not by the
acts underlying the conviction.”144 The BIA reasoned that “[i]n
determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, it is the nature of
the offense itself which determines moral turpitude.”145 The two-step
categorical approach was developed as a way “[t]o avoid leaving the
requirements of citizenship to state control”146 with the purpose of
efficiency and consistency.147
The first step of the categorical approach instructed courts to look to
“the inherent nature of the crime as defined by statute”148 and ask
“whether moral turpitude ‘necessarily inheres’ in a conviction under a
particular statute.”149 The majority of circuits used one of three tests to
determine whether violating a particular statute necessarily involved
moral turpitude under the first step of the categorical approach: (1) leastculpable conduct test, (2) realistic-probability test, or (3) common-case
approach.150 These tests helped courts determine whether the statute at
issue was a “categorical match” for the CIMT provision requiring
removal.151 If every crime committed under the statute necessarily
involved moral turpitude, then there was a categorical match.152 However,
if the statute was found to cover conduct that would not necessarily
involve moral turpitude, then there was no categorial match. 153
The least-culpable-conduct test looks to the “minimum criminal
143. See generally KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., HOW TO USE THE
CATEGORICAL APPROACH NOW (2019), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/how_to_
use_the_categorical_approach_now_dec_2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5QA-XK4C].
144. 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFS. MANUAL – VISAS § 9 FAM 40.21(a) n.2 (2005),
http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/pdf/imm06_chang_app1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4RM-55N9] (emphasis
in original).
145. Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (B.I.A. 1989).
146. See Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 429 (5th Cir. 2001).
147. See Dadhania, supra note 87, at 325.
148. Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 137.
149. Sara Salem, Should They Stay or Should They Go: Rethinking the Use of Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude in Immigration Law, 70 FLA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2018).
150. Id. at 234–36.
151. BRADY, supra note 143, at 2. Courts appear to determine which test to use dependent on
precedent within their circuit.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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conduct necessary to satisfy the essential elements of the crime” in order
to determine whether any hypothetical set of facts under the statute would
be considered a CIMT.154 Alternatively, the realistic-probability test “asks
whether moral turpitude necessarily inheres in all cases that have a
realistic probability of being prosecuted.”155 Lastly, the common-case
approach asks whether the common conviction under a particular statute
involves moral turpitude.156 Under any of the tests used by the circuit
courts, the actual conduct of the noncitizen played no role in the decision.
Rather, if the statute “defines a crime in which turpitude necessarily
inheres, then the conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude.”157
This analysis necessarily involved evaluating a hypothetical scenario to
determine if moral turpitude was involved, rather than looking to the
particular facts of the crime that the noncitizen was actually convicted
of.158
If the court concluded there was a categorical match under its chosen
test, then the inquiry ended and the noncitizen was deemed to have
committed a CIMT.159 However, if there was no categorical match, then
courts moved to the second step of the categorical analysis, which was
referred to as a “modified categorical approach.”160
In the second step, courts considered information beyond just the
elements of the statute, which allowed them to look at the noncitizen’s
record of conviction “to determine, at a minimum, under which portion of
the statute [they were] convicted to ascertain whether convictions under
that portion necessarily involve moral turpitude.”161 This could include
“the indictment, jury instructions, charging documents, or plea
agreements.”162 Nevertheless, courts were still not permitted to consider
the underlying facts of the noncitizen’s conviction “that are extrinsic to
the record of conviction.”163 After consulting the record of conviction, if
the court determined that the particular offense the noncitizen was
convicted of involved moral turpitude, then the noncitizen was found to
have committed a CIMT.164
154. Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008).
155. Salem, supra note 149, at 236.
156. Id. at 235.
157. Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (B.I.A. 1989).
158. See supra notes 143–146 and accompanying text.
159. BRADY, supra note 143, at 3.
160. Dadhania, supra note 87, at 329.
161. Id.
162. Salem, supra note 149, at 237.
163. Dadhania, supra note 87, at 330.
164. Id.
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Under this two-step categorial approach, three categories of crimes
were easily defined as involving moral turpitude: (1) crimes against
people;165 (2) crimes against property;166 and (3) crimes with an element
of fraud.167 Beyond these categories, the line to determine whether a crime
is a CIMT was much more uncertain, and courts often came out differently
on identical questions of law.168 Examples include failure to report a
felony to authorities,169 falsely using a social security number,170 and
driving under the influence.171 Accordingly, noncitizens were potentially
subject to automatic deportation based on which circuit their case was
heard in—because the circuit determined which test was used in the first
step of the categorical approach—rather than on the nature of the crime
they actually committed.172 These diverse outcomes arguably ran afoul of
the constitutional principle that “Congress shall have [p]ower
[t]o . . . establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”173
B.

The BIA’s Attempt at Uniformity: The Silva-Trevino Trio

With the difficulty of applying the two-step categorical approach and
the resulting uncertain outcomes, the BIA sought to create a uniform
framework for courts to use to determine what crimes involve moral
turpitude. The Attorney General issued three decisions, each of which
attempted to create a new categorical approach that courts could use to

165. Examples include murder, rape, and kidnapping. Svirnovskiy, supra note 88, at 41.
166. Examples include arson, burglary, or embezzlement. Id.
167. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (“Fraud is the touchstone by which this case
should be judged.”).
168. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694–95 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550
(Att’y Gen. 2015) (“Yet under the existing arrangement, [noncitizens] who commit identical offenses
may be treated differently with respect to eligibility . . . adjustment of status.”); see infra section III.C.
169. Compare Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871, 878–81 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that
misprision of a felony is a crime involving moral turpitude), with Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d
702, 705 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that misprision of a felony is not a crime involving moral turpitude).
170. Compare Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that falsely
using a social security number is not a CIMT), with Lateef v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 592 F.3d 926,
929 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that falsely using a social security number is a CIMT).
171. Compare Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that
driving under the influence is a CIMT), with Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 93 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(holding that driving under the influence is not a CIMT).
172. Frank George, On Moral Grounds: Denouncing the Board’s Framework for Identifying
Crimes of Moral Turpitude, 51 AKRON L. REV. 577, 604 (2017) (“[I]nconsistent approaches leads to
a troubling realization: noncitizens’ morality will be determined based on the jurisdiction’s
categorical approach, rather than on the conviction.”).
173. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added); see also Salem, supra note 149, at 238–39
(arguing that the inconsistent outcomes produced by the CIMT framework run contrary to the desire
for a uniform federal law and the Constitution’s requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization).
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analyze CIMTs. Silva-Trevino I instructed courts to employ a three-step
categorical test, which allowed judges to consider the underlying facts of
the noncitizen’s conviction. Silva-Trevino II vacated Silva-Trevino I on
the basis that the three-step test violated the language of the INA. Finally,
Silva-Trevino III reverted back to the two-step categorical approach that
courts used prior to Silva-Trevino I, but allowed courts to defer to
controlling circuit precedent. Ultimately, after Silva-Trevino III, the
CIMT framework remains unworkable in achieving uniform outcomes
across circuit courts.
1.

Silva-Trevino I Established a Three-Step Categorical Approach to
CIMT Analysis

In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued Matter of SilvaTrevino174 (Silva-Trevino I) to address the lack of uniformity across courts
for defining CIMTs.175 The Attorney General is authorized to refer cases
to themselves from the BIA in order to issue opinions regarding
interpretation of immigration statutes.176 The goal of Silva-Trevino I was
“to establish a uniform framework for ensuring that the [INA’s] moral
turpitude provisions are fairly and accurately applied.”177 The respondent
in Silva-Trevino I was a Mexican citizen who was admitted into the United
States as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) and faced possible
deportation for committing a crime.178 The issue before the court was
whether the criminal offense of “indecency with a child” under the Texas
Penal Code was a crime involving moral turpitude.179
In issuing the opinion, the Attorney General held that courts should
apply a three-step categorical approach to determine whether a
noncitizen’s conviction is a CIMT, rather than the previously-used twostep categorical approach.180 First, courts were instructed to conduct a
categorical review of the statute under the realistic-probability test.181 If
after this first step the court determined that the “statute encompasses both
conduct that involves moral turpitude and conduct that does not,” then the

174. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Att’y Gen. 2015).
175. Id. at 688.
176. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2022). These decisions receive Chevron deference. See Naeem
v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that decisions from the Attorney General are
afforded Chevron deference).
177. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688.
178. Id. at 690–91.
179. Id. at 690.
180. Id. at 704; see supra section II.A.
181. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 698.
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court moved to the second step.182 The second step was a modified
categorical approach in which “adjudicators consider whether the
[noncitizen]’s record of conviction evidences a crime that in fact involved
moral turpitude.”183 If the record of conviction was inconclusive to
determine whether the noncitizen’s conviction involved moral turpitude,
then courts were instructed to go to a third step where “immigration judges
should be permitted to consider evidence beyond that record.”184 By
incorporating the third step, the Attorney General opened the door to
evaluating the underlying facts of the noncitizen’s conviction, which was
not permitted under the previous two-step categorical approach. After this
opinion came out, many courts were reluctant to apply the three-step
approach.185
2.

Silva-Trevino II Rejected the Three-Step Categorical Approach
Established in Silva-Trevino I

Even after the Attorney General issued Silva-Trevino I, the three-step
categorical approach was not widely used. While some courts fully
adopted the three-step approach, most rejected it in full or utilized only
part of the analysis.186 Six years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Silva-Trevino v. Holder187 that the third step of the three-step
categorical approach was contrary to the “unambiguous language” of the
INA.188 Accordingly, the Attorney General vacated Silva-Trevino I and
asked the BIA to address “[h]ow adjudicators are to determine whether a
particular criminal offense is a crime involving moral turpitude under the
[INA].”189 This decision came to be known as Silva-Trevino II.

182. Id. (emphasis in original).
183. Id. This second step would typically be used when the statue at issue includes multiple
provisions, some which do involve moral turpitude and some which do not involve moral turpitude.
Id.
184. Id. at 699.
185. Dadhania, supra note 87, at 341–43. At the time this decision was rendered, the Seventh
Circuit adopted the three-step approach in its entirety; the Ninth Circuit adopted the first two steps
but was reluctant to apply the third step requiring inquiry beyond the record of conviction; and the
Third and Eighth Circuits entirely refused to follow the three-step approach. See id. at 341–44.
186. Salem, supra note 149, at 241–42.
187. 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014).
188. Id. at 198.
189. Silva-Trevino II, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Att’y Gen. 2015). The Attorney General also asked
the BIA to weigh in on a couple other issues, but those are outside the scope of this Comment.
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Silva-Trevino III Revived the Two-Step Categorical Approach to
CIMT Analysis

In 2016, the CIMT analysis was revisited for a third and final time in
Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino III),190 which once again attempted to
provide a uniform CIMT framework. Silva-Trevino III set forth a two-step
categorical test, with the second step mimicking the modified categorical
approach that had been previously applied by circuit courts. The SilvaTrevino III decision currently controls CIMT analysis.
In the first step of the test, courts must determine whether the offense
at issue “fits within the generic definition of a crime involving moral
turpitude.”191 Silva-Trevino III further instructs courts to apply the
realistic probability test by “focus[ing] on the minimum conduct that has
a realistic probability of being prosecuted under the statute of conviction,
rather than on the facts underlying the respondent’s particular violation of
the statute.”192 However, this test is not mandatory; courts are instructed
to apply the realistic probability test “unless controlling circuit law
expressly dictate[d] otherwise.”193 In other words, if a particular circuit
has precedent utilizing the minimum conduct test or the common-case
approach in its CIMT analysis, then its courts could continue to use that
test rather than employing the realistic probability test as instructed by the
Silva Trevino III framework. Effectively, this puts the CIMT analysis right
back to where it was pre-2008: courts can apply whichever test they
want—typically realistic-probability, minimum conduct, or commoncase—within the categorical analysis based on the precedent of the
particular circuit.
The second step instructs courts to apply the same modified categorical
approach that they had applied prior to Silva-Trevino I: “In cases where
the statute of conviction includes some crimes that involve moral
turpitude and some that do not, adjudicators must determine if the statute
is . . . susceptible to a modified categorical analysis.”194 As such, where a
statute includes multiple crimes—only some of which could be
considered CIMTs—courts are permitted to “resort to the record of
conviction . . . to identify the statutory provision that the respondent was
convicted of violating.”195
Silva-Trevino III set forth the controlling framework that courts
190. 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016).
191. Id. at 831.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 832.
194. Id. at 833.
195. Id.
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currently follow to determine whether a noncitizen’s conviction is a
CIMT. Nevertheless, decisions have been anything but uniform across the
circuits.196
III. DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING THE SILVA-TREVINO III
ANALYSIS
Post-Silva Trevino III, uniform application of the CIMT analysis
remains elusive. While a categorical approach generally seeks to
“promote efficiency, fairness, and predictability”197 in adjudicating
immigration cases, the practical application falls short due, in part, to the
influence of moral judgments within the analysis. This Part evaluates the
influence of a judge’s personal moral beliefs on the CIMT analysis. In
particular, this Part looks at a type of crime that should allow an “easy”
application of the CIMT analysis: regulatory offenses. Regulatory
offenses are considered to be mala prohibita crimes, which historically do
not involve moral turpitude because they are crimes that are “wrong only
because made so by statute.”198 Nevertheless, this Part focuses on a
current circuit split over whether failure to register as a sex offender
constitutes a CIMT.
A.

The Role of Subjective Moral Judgments in Determining Whether a
Crime Necessarily Involves Moral Turpitude

Currently, courts apply the Silva-Trevino III two-step categorical
analysis to evaluate whether a particular crime involves moral
turpitude.199 However, this analysis does not yield uniform results because
courts can utilize a variety of tests within this analysis depending upon
precedent within their circuit.200 Further, courts do not base a finding of
moral turpitude solely on criminalization, but rather where the “clear
consensus in contemporary American society” finds that certain conduct
has a “profoundly degrading nature.”201 This makes outcomes

196. See Lindsay M. Kornegay & Evan Tsen Lee, Why Deporting Immigrants for “Crimes
Involving Moral Turpitude” Is Now Unconstitutional, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 61–
63 nn.90–98 (2017).
197. Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015).
198. State v. Horton, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (N.C. 1905).
199. See supra section II.B.3.
200. See supra section II.A.
201. Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382, 390 (B.I.A. 2018) (determining that animal fighting is like
prostitution and incest and thus inherently reprehensible regardless of whether any injury actually
occurred); see also Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1192 (B.I.A. 1999) (explaining that under the
moral turpitude analysis, “the nature of a crime is measured against contemporary moral standards”).
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unpredictable because moral standards “may be susceptible to change
based on the prevailing views of society.”202
Ultimately, the BIA decides what it views as morally reprehensible
behavior.203 As such, even victimless crimes have been considered CIMTs
when they are found to “offend ‘the most fundamental values of
society.’”204 Seeing this problem, some courts have warned of the danger
of conflating CIMTs with any crime at all: “That an offense contravenes
‘societal duties’ is not enough to make it a crime involving moral
turpitude; otherwise, every crime would involve moral turpitude.”205 In
one concurring opinion, Judge Posner queried, “What does ‘the public
conscience’ mean? What does ‘inherently base, vile, or
depraved’ . . . mean and how do any of these terms differ from . . . ’the
duties owed between persons or to society in general’?”206
This side-eye towards moral judgments is not new. Indeed, the first
judicial opinion to push back on the use of “moral turpitude” in
deportation decisions came in 1947.207 In United States ex rel Manzella v.
Zimmerman,208 the district court condemned the CIMT provision in the
INA by highlighting the way in which a judge’s personal morals play a
significant role:
I agree with those who regard it as most unfortunate that Congress
has chosen to base the right of a [noncitizen] to remain in this
country upon the application of a phrase so lacking in legal
precision and, therefore, so likely to result in a judge applying to
the case before him his own personal views as to the mores of the
community.209
This concern has since been echoed in subsequent decisions. For
example, in his dissent in Jordan v. De George, Justice Jackson reasoned
that, given the expansiveness of the country, “acts that are regarded as
criminal in some states are lawful in others.”210 Justice Jackson further
opined that perceptions of morality would similarly lack uniformity across
202. Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1192.
203. See Koh, Crimmigration Beyond the Headlines, supra note 11, at 272. For a more in depth
discussion and analysis on the role of implicit biases in immigration decisions, see Fatma E. Marouf,
Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417 (2011).
204. Koh, Crimmigration Beyond the Headlines, supra note 11, at 273.
205. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. AguilaMontes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011)).
206. Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring).
207. Craig S. Lerner, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: The Constitutional and Persistent
Immigration Law Doctrine, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 93 (2021).
208. 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
209. Id. at 537.
210. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 238–39 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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the country and that lower court decisions would “rest . . . upon the moral
reactions of particular judges to particular offenses.”211
B.

Moral Judgments Influence the Evaluation of Regulatory Offense
Under the CIMT Analysis

In addition to the two-step categorial approach set forth in SilvaTrevino III, the BIA and lower courts can look to the common law
distinction between mala in se crimes and mala prohibita crimes to
determine whether moral turpitude is involved.212 A crime that is malum
in se is “naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community,”
whereas a crime that is malum prohibitum is “wrong only because made
so by statute.”213 This distinction is helpful because these categories are
based, in part, on a moral judgment. Therefore, many traditional moral
offenses, like murder and theft,214 are considered mala in se.215
Historically, courts have reasoned that CIMTs involve mala in se crimes,
as opposed to mala prohibita crimes.216
By these commonly used definitions, mala prohibita crimes do not
involve “moral turpitude” in the general sense of the phrase because such
acts are not inherently wrong, but rather they are wrong solely by way of
statute.217 Therefore, under the categorical approach used in the CIMT
211. Id.
212. See Holper, supra note 15, at 656; 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 45–48 (1986).
213. State v. Horton, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (N.C. 1905); see also Malum in se, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/malum%20in%20se
[https://perma.cc/45S8-L3YU]
(defining as “an offense that is evil or wrong from its own nature irrespective of statute”); Malum
Prohibitum,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/malum%20
prohibitum [https://perma.cc/FY2L-BJVB] (defining as “an offense prohibited by statute but not
inherently evil or wrong”).
214. Horton, 51 S.E. at 946.
215. Stephen S. Schwartz, Is There a Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal Law?,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1280–81 (2008).
216. See, e.g., Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980) (reasoning that a CIMT “has been
defined as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se, so it
is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral
turpitude”); The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in se in Criminal Law, Note, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 74, 84–85 (1930) (“Thus the determination under immigration . . . statutes of
whether or not an individual has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude has in some
cases been made to depend upon whether the crime was malum in se.”).
217. See Arthur D. Greenfield, Malum Prohibitum: Moral, Legal and Practical Distinctions
Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se and Danger to Civic Conscience When Former Are Too
Numerous, 7 A.B.A. J. 493, 493 (1921); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 212, at 45 (“It has
been said that a crime of which a criminal intent is an element is malum in se, but if no criminal intent
is required, it is malum prohibitum; and that generally a crime involving ‘moral turpitude’ is malum
in se, but otherwise it is malum prohibitum.”).
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analysis, these crimes should not, in theory, be found to involve moral
turpitude. Nevertheless, lower courts have found that certain regulatory
offenses are crimes involving moral turpitude,218 which necessarily
transforms them into deportable offenses for noncitizens.
Regulatory offenses are typically created for the purpose of keeping
public order.219 The Supreme Court considers regulatory offenses to
“impair[] the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as
presently constituted,” but differ from other crimes in the sense that they
“result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely
create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize.”220
Regulatory offenses are not thought to reflect an evil intent amounting to
moral turpitude.221 Indeed, the BIA even held as much in 1943, when it
determined that a violation of a statute requiring liquor retailers to pay a
tax was not a CIMT.222
But just as the line is unclear between crimes that involve moral
turpitude and those that do not, so too is the line between mala in se crimes
and mala prohibita crimes as caselaw has developed.223 Conducting the
current CIMT analysis with regulatory offenses is difficult because it
“blends elements of purely statutory infractions and elements requiring
some degree of morally objectionable action.”224 As a result, the BIA
recognized that there is no bright line rule excepting mala prohibita
offenses from being considered CIMTs225 even though it has “many times
held that the violation of a regulatory . . . provision of a statute is not a

218. See, e.g., Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732, 738 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We see no bright line rule that
excludes a regulatory offense from the scope of the statute when it involves reprehensible conduct
and a culpable mental state.”).
219. Schwartz, supra note 215, at 1280–81.
220. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
221. See, e.g., Crimes of Moral Turpitude: § 9.44 14. Regulatory Offenses, LAW OFFS. OF NORTON
TOOBY, https://nortontooby.com/node/18465#booktext [https://perma.cc/WVV7-X2LB] (providing
legal advice for CIMTs and explaining that “[c]onvictions for violation of regulatory statutes
generally are not considered to involve moral turpitude because there is nothing inherently wrong
with engaging in the particular activity, except that someone has passed a law against it”).
222. See Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing H—, I. & N. Dec. 394, 395
(B.I.A. 1943)).
223. See Evan F. McCarthy, Note, Justices, Justices, Look Through Your Books, and Make Me a
Perfect Match: An Argument for the Realistic Probability Test in CIMT Removal Proceedings, 104
IOWA L. REV. 2269, 2275 (2019); see also Elijah T. Staggers, Note, The Racialization of Crimes
Involving Moral Turpitude, 12 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 17, 26 (2020) (noting the
difficulty of pinpointing the line between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes).
224. McCarthy, supra note 223, at 2275.
225. See Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1193 (B.I.A. 1999) (“While it is generally the case
that a crime that is ‘malum in se’ involves moral turpitude and that a ‘malum prohibitum’ offense
does not, this categorization is more a general rule than an absolute standard.”).
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crime involving moral turpitude.”226
C.

Sex Offender Registration Statutes as an Example of the CIMT
Analysis Rendering Disparate Results

Sex offender registration statutes serve as a prime example of how the
CIMT analysis is unpredictable even with respect to regulatory—or mala
prohibitum—crimes. Looking at circuit court decisions shows how judges
can reach opposite outcomes for nearly identical offenses under the
current CIMT framework.227 As a result, noncitizens convicted of failing
to register as a sex offender have no way of knowing if that regulatory
offense will lead to deportation.
In Efagene v. Holder,228 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
failing to register as a sex offender was not categorically a CIMT because
it did not involve any identifiable victim, actual harm, or intent to cause
harm.229 Francis Efagene, formerly a citizen of Nigeria, was admitted into
the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1991.230 In 2005, he
pled guilty to the offense of sexual conduct-no consent,231 a misdemeanor
in the state of Colorado.232 As part of his sentence, Efagene had to register
as a sex offender for the following ten years.233 In 2007, after serving 364
days in jail, the state arrested Efagene for missing the registration deadline
and ultimately pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of failure-toregister.234 These two misdemeanor offenses made Efagene automatically
removable, as each was considered a CIMT.235 Efagene challenged his
removal, arguing that failure to register as a sex offender did not constitute
a CIMT.236
In its majority opinion, the Tenth Circuit made explicit reference to the
difference between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes—the former
involving moral turpitude and the latter not involving moral turpitude.237
The majority ultimately reasoned that failing to comply with the
226. Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 776 (B.I.A. 1968).
227. See Kornegay & Lee, supra note 196, at 61–63 nn.90–98.
228. 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011).
229. Id. at 922.
230. Id. at 920.
231. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-404 (2022).
232. Efagene, 642 F.3d at 920.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (authorizing deportation for noncitizens who have
been convicted of two or more CIMTs at any time after admission).
236. Efagene, 642 F.3d at 920.
237. Id. at 921.
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procedural rules set forth by the sex offender registration statute does not
categorially involve moral turpitude because there was no “identifiable
victim, any actual harm, or any intent to cause harm.”238 The majority
further explained that an individual could be convicted of failing to
register as a sex offender because they notified law enforcement of an
address change after six business days, rather than the required five.239
Such conduct, while wrong by virtue of violating the requirement of a
statute to update authorities within five business days, is not the type of
conduct that “society deems inherently base, vile, or depraved.”240
In May 2020, on a nearly identical question of law, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals came out the opposite way on the CIMT analysis for
failing to register under a sex offender registration statute.241 In Bakor v.
Barr,242 Tua Mene Lebi Bakor was convicted of two CIMTs, which
triggered mandatory deportation under the INA.243 Bakor was admitted
into the United States in 1999 as a refugee and became a lawful permanent
resident in 2002.244 In 2001, Bakor was convicted of criminal sexual
conduct in the fifth degree and, as part of his sentence, had to comply with
the Minnesota sex offender registration law.245 Like Efagene, Bakor
ultimately failed to comply and pled guilty to that charge in 2015.246 As a
result, he was ordered removed in 2017 for being convicted of two crimes
involving moral turpitude.247
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the BIA’s determination that
failure to register as a sex offender was a CIMT.248 The majority found
that “[t]he line between malum in se and malum prohibitum . . . is murky
and controversial.”249 Even though failing to register is a regulatory
offense, the majority found no bright line rule that precludes a finding of
238. Id. at 922.
239. Id. at 924.
240. Id.
241. See Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2020).
242. 958 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2020).
243. Id. at 734–35; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
244. Bakor, 958 F.3d at 734.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 734–35.
248. Id. at 737 (“Where society has imposed a duty based on a compelling need to protect public
safety, it is permissible for the Board to conclude that one who knowingly ignores that duty acts in a
morally reprehensible manner. The Board reasonably concluded that knowing and willful failure to
register as a sex offender, which frustrates society’s efforts to monitor serious offenders and to protect
vulnerable victims from predictable recidivism, is the sort of morally turpitudinous criminal conduct
that subjects [a noncitizen] to removal from the country.”).
249. Id. at 738.
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a CIMT where “the scope of the statute . . . involves reprehensible
conduct and a culpable mental state.”250 The majority further relied on the
BIA’s decision in Tobar-Lobo251 where it held that failing to register
under a California sex offender registration statute was a crime of moral
turpitude.252 The BIA reached this conclusion by reasoning that “the
nature of a crime is measured against contemporary moral standards.”253
In that case, the BIA reasoned that sex offender registration statutes are
used in every state due to “outrage over sexual crimes—particularly those
targeting children.”254 Therefore, the BIA concluded that the act of failing
to register as a sex offender was necessarily base or vile.255 Similar
reasoning was employed in Bakor: the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that “knowing and willful failure to register as a sex offender . . . is
the sort of morally turpitudinous criminal conduct that subjects [a
noncitizen] to removal from the country.”256 But, as the dissenting opinion
noted, this decision diverged from every circuit that had ruled on whether
failing to register as a sex offender constituted a CIMT.257
In support of its petition for a writ of certiorari, counsel for petitioner
Bakor provided the following in an attempt to prove that regulatory
offenses cannot inherently involve moral turpitude:
A simple thought experiment proves the point: if the Minnesota
sex-offender registration law did not exist, would Bakor have
acted immorally by knowingly failing to inform the authorities of
his address? The answer, of course, is no; his action was wrong
only because a statute said so—and so it follows that his offense
is not inherently immoral.258
The Supreme Court ultimately denied Bakor’s petition for certiorari,259
which confirmed the order of removal. The outcome of Bakor’s case
would likely have been different if it was heard in another circuit. As such,
the decision to deport Bakor was not based solely on whether moral

250. Id.
251. 24 I. & N. Dec. 143 (B.I.A. 2007).
252. Id. at 146–48.
253. Id. at 144.
254. Id. at 145.
255. Id. at 146.
256. Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2020).
257. Id. at 741 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885, 889 (4th Cir. 2014);
Totimeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2012); Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 926 (10th
Cir. 2011); Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008)).
258. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Bakor, 958 F.3d 732 (No. 20-837), 2020 WL 8571668, at
*22 (emphasis in original).
259. See Bakor v. Garland, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021).
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turpitude necessarily inhered in the crime of failing to register as a sex
offender; rather, the decision was heavily informed by the personal moral
judgments of the judges on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. This
shows the failure of the Silva-Trevino III two-step categorical approach,
under which circuit courts are able to come out differently on identical
questions of law. Moving forward, a noncitizen cannot know whether
failing to comply with a registration statute will render them deportable
because, per Bakor, courts are able to reach their own conclusions about
CIMTs even against the great weight of authority.
IV. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME
COURT
This split over sex offender registration statutes demonstrates the
unpredictability of the CIMT analysis even as applied to mala prohibita
crimes, which were thought to not inherently involve moral turpitude. As
a result, the decisions appear to be arbitrary insofar as they depend on the
personal moral beliefs of the adjudicator, which leaves noncitizens
without proper notice of what crimes constitute CIMTs. Because of this,
many legal scholars and courts argue that the CIMT provisions in the INA
should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague.260 Although this
challenge was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1951 in Jordan v. De
George, a series of recent decisions purporting to expand the void-forvagueness doctrine may provide a renewed vagueness challenge to crimes
involving moral turpitude.
This Part gives a brief primer on the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
which has its roots in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments,261 before addressing the first and only challenge
brought to the Supreme Court that the CIMT provisions in the INA are
unconstitutionally vague. Then, this Part walks through three recent
Supreme Court decisions that appear to expand the scope of the void-forvagueness doctrine, ultimately setting up the solution of this Comment—
there is a renewed vagueness challenge given the unpredictable
framework set forth in Silva-Trevino III and the Court’s apparent
260. See, e.g., Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1177 (arguing that the phrase “crime
involving moral turpitude” presents vagueness problems); Holper, supra note 15, at 663–64 (arguing
that the term should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague through an as-applied challenge);
Kornegay & Lee, supra note 196, at 116 (concluding that being deported for a CIMT violated due
process “because the standard on its face is void for vagueness”); Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d
1249, 1251–61 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (arguing that CIMT is unconstitutionally vague, and
referencing the myriad other judges and justices who have found the phrase to be vague and
unworkable).
261. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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willingness to expand the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
A.

Overview of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is derived from the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, allowing
a statute to be struck down if it is deemed unconstitutionally vague.262 A
statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give ordinary people fair
notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.”263 Thus, the void-for-vagueness doctrine operates
on two primary goals: (1) providing notice; and (2) ”avoiding arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement of the law.”264 These two goals provide
independent grounds for concluding that a statute is unconstitutionally
vague.265
The first goal of the doctrine is fair warning, which is based on an
objective standard: courts ask whether the law gives “[a] person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly.”266 The guarantee of notice is important
because it ensures that—in the case of immigration grounds of
deportation, including CIMTs—noncitizens know what conduct could
lead to deportation.267
The Court has cited the second goal of avoiding arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as “the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine.”268 In furtherance of this goal, statutes must provide
guideposts for when conduct becomes unlawful (or in the case of CIMTs,
when moral turpitude necessarily inheres).269 Understanding that judges
are afforded some form of subjective discretion in ruling on individual
cases, the Court has emphasized that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
if it “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously

262. See Roger A. Fairfax & John C. Harrison, The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, NAT’L
CONST. CTR.: INTERACTIVE CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/
interpretation/amendment-v/clauses/633 [https://perma.cc/VE3Y-BZAA]; Koh, Void for Vagueness,
supra note 86, at 1134.
263. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).
264. Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1134.
265. Lerner, supra note 207, at 115–16.
266. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
267. Jessica A. Lowe, Note, Analyzing the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine as Applied to Statutory
Defenses: Lessons from Iowa’s Stand-Your-Ground Law, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2359, 2366 (2020)
(“Fundamentally, the notice requirement ensures that individuals can delineate between lawful and
unlawful conduct.”).
268. Id. at 2369.
269. Id. at 2370.
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discriminatory enforcement.”270
While the void-for-vagueness doctrine originated as a protection for
criminal defendants with respect to criminal laws, it also applies to
noncitizens with respect to immigration laws.271 When evaluating a
vagueness challenge to the CIMT provision, the Supreme Court reasoned
that “[d]espite that fact that [it] is not a criminal statute, we shall
nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine . . . in
view of the grave nature of deportation.”272 Evaluating immigration
statutes under the vagueness doctrine is also crucial because of its purpose
to safeguard separation of powers.273 If a vague law is passed by Congress,
the duty to interpret it is placed on “unelected prosecutors and judges.”274
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that certain provisions of the INA
that implicate one of the harshest penalties—deportation—are
unambiguous so that judges cannot “rewrite the vague law”275 based on
their personal beliefs.
Although noncitizen respondents in removal proceedings are stripped
of many of the procedural safeguards afforded to defendants in criminal
proceedings,276 they do receive some constitutional protections under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.277 The Due Process Clause
guarantees that, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”278 Noncitizens are included under
this provision because the Constitution mandates due process to all
persons as opposed to all citizens.279 Further, the Supreme Court long ago
270. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
271. See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230–31 (1951) (evaluating the CIMT provision
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine); Boutilier v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118,
123 (1967) (allowing a vagueness challenge as a defense to deportation); see also Koh, Void for
Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1140–42 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of the void-forvagueness doctrine as applied to immigration law).
272. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231.
273. Lowe, supra note 267, at 2365.
274. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 (2019)).
275. Id.
276. See supra section I.C.
277. Gretchen Frazee, What Constitutional Rights Do Undocumented Immigrants Have?, PBS
NEWS HOUR (June 25, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-constitutionalrights-do-undocumented-immigrants-have [https://perma.cc/U7AW-TF8C]; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process
of law in deportation proceedings.”).
278. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
279. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (“No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.” (emphasis added)). Even undocumented immigrants have the constitutional rights of
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noted the unique challenges that noncitizens face in immigration
proceedings when it called for invoking the Due Process Clause for
people “whose roots may have become . . . deeply fixed in this land.”280
The Court later reasoned that “[noncitizens] who have once passed
through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law.”281 At a minimum, due process requires that noncitizens
in removal proceedings be afforded “[a] full and fair hearing.”282 The
Court and Constitution leave the rest of the determination of what
amounts to due process for noncitizens to the discretion of Congress.283
B.

The Implication of Jordan v. De George on a Vagueness Challenge
to CIMTs

The first and only time the Supreme Court considered a vagueness
challenge to the CIMT provisions in the INA was in 1951 in Jordan v. De
George.284 The case before the Court asked whether “conspiracy to
defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits [was] a crime
involving moral turpitude” under the INA.285 The Court stated that in
determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, “[t]he test is
whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.”286 It concluded that “[f]raud is the touchstone by which [the]
case should be judged.”287 Because the crime before the Court was
conspiracy to defraud, it found that fraud necessarily inhered in the
conduct, and thus was obviously—according to the Court—one of moral
turpitude.288
However, the Court declined to evaluate whether the CIMT provision
is unconstitutionally vague when the crime at issue does not involve fraud.
The majority stated at the end of its opinion, “[w]hatever else the phrase
due process, but that process looks different depending on the type of proceeding and the individual.
Frazee, supra note 277.
280. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
281. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (emphasis added).
282. Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011).
283. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
284. 341 U.S. 223 (1951); see also Kornegay & Lee, supra note 196, at 99 (“De George is the only
case where the Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of whether the moral turpitude doctrine
is unconstitutionally vague and should be construed narrowly.”).
285. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 223–24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
286. Id. at 231–32.
287. Id. at 232.
288. Id.
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‘crime involving moral turpitude’ may mean in peripheral cases, the
decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient
have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.”289
Justice Jackson wrote a vigorous dissent. He warned that “[u]niformity
and equal protection of the law can come only from a statutory definition
of fairly stable and confined bounds.”290 Giving a nod to the overlap
between deportation and criminal punishments, he noted that deporting a
noncitizen is an additional punishment above the sentence that already
must be served for being found guilty of committing a crime in the first
place.291 Compared with citizens, a noncitizen’s due process rights are
even more crucial because deportation triggers “a life sentence of exile
from what has become home.”292 Therefore, such a “savage penalty”
requires “definite and certain” standards when courts are left to determine
when a crime necessarily involves moral turpitude.293
The Court’s decision in Jordan remains the controlling precedent on
the question of whether the CIMT provisions in the INA are
unconstitutionally vague.294 The Supreme Court appears reluctant to
revisit its decision. The Court has been petitioned for certiorari numerous
times in recent years to address whether the phrase “crime involving
moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague, but it has consistently denied
certiorari.295

289. Id.
290. Id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 243.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 229; see, e.g., Vidale v. Att’y Gen. United States, 783 F. App’x 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2019)
(finding that Jordan v. De George is “controlling Supreme Court precedent” and therefore must be
followed); Martinez-de Ryan v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 247, 252 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e are obliged to
follow on-point Supreme Court precedent—here, Jordan . . . .”).
295. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Martinez-de Ryan v. Barr, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct.
134 (2019) (No. 18-1085), 2019 WL 852262, at *i (petitioning for certiorari on the question of
“whether the phrase ‘moral turpitude’ is unconstitutionally vague”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
i, Islas-Veloz v. Barr, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2704 (2020) (No. 19-627), 2019 WL 6115071, at *i
(petitioning for certiorari on the question of “[w]hether the phrase ‘crime involving moral
turpitude’ . . . is unconstitutionally vague”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Olivas-Motta v. Barr,
__ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1105 (2020) (No. 19-282), 2019 WL 4190336, at *i (petitioning for certiorari
on the question of “[w]hether the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ is void for vagueness”);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mercado-Ramirez v. Barr, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1105 (2020)
(No. 19-284), 2019 WL 4190395, at *i (petitioning for certiorari on the question of “[w]hether the
phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ is void for vagueness”).
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The Supreme Court’s Recent Expansion of the Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine

Many courts are reluctant to hold a statute unconstitutionally vague
because it infringes on the presumption that statutes dictated by Congress
are constitutional.296 Notably, from 1960 to 2015, the Court invalidated
criminal statutes as unconstitutionally vague a mere five times.297 This
trend ended in 2015 and has since taken a sharp turn in the opposite
direction. Three recent Supreme Court decisions appear to expand the
void-for-vagueness doctrine: Johnson v. United States,298 Sessions v.
Dimaya,299 and United States v. Davis.300 The expansion exemplified by
these cases has the potential to provide a renewed vagueness challenge to
the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” notwithstanding the Court’s
precedent set in Jordan.
1.

Johnson v. United States

In Johnson, the Court considered the meaning of the phrase “violent
felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA).301 Under the
ACCA, an individual “convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm” received a more severe punishment if they had previously been
convicted three or more times for a “violent felony.”302 In defining
“violent felony,” this provision of the ACCA had a clause at the end that
included crimes that “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”303 This came to be known as
the “residual clause.”304
Defining crimes under the residual clause provision of the ACCA
required a categorical approach, similar to the one used in CIMT
analysis.305 In determining whether a crime constituted a violent felony,
courts assessed how the law generally defines the offense at issue, rather
than evaluating the conduct of the individual who actually committed the

296. Lowe, supra note 267, at 2370.
297. Id.
298. 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
299. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
300. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
301. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924); see also Johnson,
576 U.S. at 593.
302. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 593.
303. Id. at 594 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)).
304. See id. at 591.
305. See supra section II.B.1.
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offense on a particular occasion.306 Until Johnson, judges were instructed
to look at “the ordinary case”—which is similar to the common-case
approach discussed earlier307—of the crime at issue to determine whether
it “present[ed] a serious potential risk of . . . injury.”308 Relying on “[t]wo
features of the residual clause,” the Court held that this method “denies
fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.”309
First, the Court criticized the ordinary case approach, finding that there
was no way for judges to accurately measure the risk posed by certain
crimes when they had to imagine the “ordinary case” rather than
evaluating the actual facts at issue.310 Second, the residual clause required
judges to determine when a crime becomes a “serious potential risk,”
without providing a scale by which to measure crimes against.311
Ultimately, the Court held that “[b]y combining indeterminacy about how
to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much
risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the
Due Process Clause tolerates.”312
The Johnson decision further broadened the scope of the void-forvagueness doctrine “by rejecting the requirement that a statute [must] be
[entirely] vague” to be deemed unconstitutional.313 Instead, the majority
noted that the Court’s prior holdings “squarely contradict the theory that
a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct
that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”314
Accordingly, Johnson opened the door for both facial and as-applied
challenges to the CIMT provision in the INA.315 In order to bring a facial
challenge to a law, the statute either “must prohibit a substantial amount
of conduct that is protected by the First Amendment or the law must ‘fail[]
to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard
against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.’”316 Otherwise, an as306. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 596.
307. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
308. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 596.
309. Id. at 597.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 598.
312. Id.
313. Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1152.
314. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 602.
315. See Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1179.
316. Holper, supra note 15, at 664 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999))
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). Facial challenges are extremely hard to win because the
petitioner has to prove that the statute is unconstitutionally vague in every possible application. Id. at
665.
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applied challenge may be brought to determine whether a law is
constitutional as applied to the particular petitioner.317
2.

Sessions v. Dimaya

The next case the Court ruled on in its expansion of the void-forvagueness doctrine was Sessions v. Dimaya, which directly addressed a
vagueness challenge to an immigration statute. The Court in Dimaya
evaluated a similar residual clause as in Johnson, but this time under the
INA.318 At issue was the provision defining a “crime of violence” as “any
other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.”319 Like the residual clause
under the ACCA, courts applied an “ordinary case” categorical approach
to this residual clause in the INA.320 Under this test, a court must
determine “whether ‘the ordinary case’ of an offense poses the requisite
risk” to amount to a crime of violence.321
The Court reaffirmed the notion first stated in Jordan that “the most
exacting vagueness standard should apply in removal cases.”322 The Court
also took particular issue with the “ordinary case” approach, noting that it
is “an excessively ‘speculative,’ essentially inscrutable thing.”323 The
Court ultimately held that the provision at issue in Dimaya was similarly
vague as the one in Johnson: “It too ‘requires a court to picture the kind
of conduct that the crime involves in “the ordinary case,” and to judge
whether that abstraction presents’ some not-well-specified-yetsufficiently-large degree of risk.”324 Further, its use “result[ed] . . . [in]
‘more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause
tolerates.’”325
3.

United States v. Davis

The Court most recently struck down a residual clause in 2019 in
United States v. Davis.326 Davis addressed a statute that provided for
317. Id. at 664–65.
318. See Sessions v. Dimaya, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210–11 (2018).
319. Id. at 1211 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1213.
323. Id. at 1215 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015)).
324. Id. at 1216 (quoting Johnson, 576 U.S. at 596).
325. Id. (quoting Johnson, 576 U.S. at 598).
326. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
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longer prison sentences when a firearm was used “in connection with
certain other federal crimes,”327 defined as “felonies ‘that by [their] nature,
involv[e] a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.’”328 The majority cited both Johnson and Dimaya, stating that,
“[t]hose decisions teach that the imposition of criminal punishment can’t
be made to depend on a judge’s estimation of the degree of risk posed by
a crime’s imagined ‘ordinary case.’”329 In Davis, the government tried to
save the integrity of the residual clause by arguing for a rejection of the
categorical approach, and instead implemented a “case specific” approach
that examined the “actual conduct” of the individual at issue.330 However,
the Court did not find that the history of the statute supported such an
interpretation,331 and ultimately held that the provision is
unconstitutionally vague.332
Taken together, these cases indicate the Court’s willingness to entertain
vagueness challenges and highlight the Court’s suspicion of the use of
categorical tests.333 In turn, this apparent expansion of the void-forvagueness doctrine bodes well for a renewed vagueness challenge to
CIMTs, which is especially important now given the lack of uniformity in
the lower courts’ application of the CIMT analysis.
V.

A RENEWED VAGUENESS CHALLENGE TO CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE

This Part argues that the current Silva-Trevino III framework for
analyzing CIMTs fails to provide notice and enables arbitrary
enforcement, which renders it unconstitutional under the void-forvagueness doctrine. This is shown chiefly through the example of the
current circuit split over whether failing to register as a sex offender
constitutes a CIMT. This Part then argues that a new vagueness challenge
may be available for noncitizens to challenge CIMTs due to the Supreme
327. Id. at 2323.
328. Id. at 2323–24 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)).
329. Id. at 2326.
330. Id. at 2327 (quoting United States v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2018)).
331. Id. (explaining that “the statute’s text, context, and history. . . . simply cannot support the
government’s newly minted case-specific theory”).
332. Id. at 2336.
333. See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 267, at 2370–76 (concluding that “Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis
arguably indicate an expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine”); Katherine Brosamle, Comment,
Obscured Boundaries: Dimaya’s Expansion of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 52 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 187 (2018) (explaining the expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine through the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya).
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Court’s apparent willingness to expand the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
A.

The Silva-Trevino III Framework Fails to Provide Notice and
Enables Arbitrary Enforcement of the Laws

The phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” has confounded courts
for decades. The decision rendered in Silva-Trevino III attempted to
clarify the CIMT analysis by providing a two-step categorical approach
for courts to follow.334 While this analysis purported to yield uniform
results, in practice it failed to do so.335 This is in large part due to the fact
that courts may defer to controlling circuit precedent in determining which
test to apply in the first-step of the categorical approach.336 But such a
case-by-case approach is unsustainable when the penalty for each decision
is as severe as deportation.337 Accordingly, the framework set forth in
Silva-Trevino III created an analysis that fails to provide meaningful
notice to noncitizens and enables arbitrary enforcement of the
immigration system in violation of the Due Process Clause.
The current circuit split over whether failure to register as a sex
offender constitutes a CIMT demonstrates how the current CIMT
framework violates both pillars of the void-for-vagueness doctrine: failure
to provide notice and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.338 Even
though failing to register as a sex offender is a mala prohibita regulatory
crime, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld it as a CIMT.339 The
fact that there is a circuit split over a regulatory crime—which is typically
not thought to involve moral turpitude—signifies how the current CIMT
framework does not lead to predictability and uniformity and,
accordingly, should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague.
Under the current CIMT framework, a noncitizen cannot be put on
proper notice about what kinds of convictions could render them
deportable because the inquiry turns almost entirely on a moral
determination. Different adjudicators will necessarily have different
conceptions of what constitutes morally reprehensible conduct. Such a
determination can hardly be said to be anything but arbitrary as the “limits

334. See supra section II.B.3.
335. See supra Part III.
336. Silva-Trevino III, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 832 (B.I.A. 2016).
337. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a drastic measure and
at times the equivalent of banishment of exile . . . . It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence
in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.” (citation omitted)).
338. See Lowe, supra note 267, at 2365–70.
339. See supra section III.B.
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are charted by human experience.”340
The current circuit split over sex offender registration statutes also
shows how the CIMT analysis enables arbitrary enforcement of the laws
by allowing courts to come out differently on identical questions of law.
In Efagene v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that
“although there are various ways of violating the [sex offender
registration] statute, none of them involve an inherently base, vile, or
depraved act.”341 Therefore, the court held that violating the statute could
not constitute a CIMT. Alternatively, in Bakor v. Barr, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion based on its moral
interpretation of the statute. It reasoned that “[w]here society has imposed
a duty based on a compelling need to protect public safety, it is
permissible . . . to conclude that one who knowingly ignores that duty acts
in a morally reprehensible manner.”342
The decision reached in Bakor is especially notable because it shows
that the current CIMT framework allows judges to make decisions even
against the great weight of authority to the contrary in other circuits based
on a personal determination of what constitutes morally reprehensible
conduct. Accordingly, noncitizens are unable to know with certainty
whether being one day late for their sex offender registration will subject
them to deportation. This lack of notice clearly violates the fair warning
requirement of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Further, arbitrary
enforcement is shown by the fact that a crime may be considered a CIMT
in one circuit while not considered a CIMT in another, which violates the
second pillar of the doctrine. Taken together, in light of the current split
over sex offender registration statutes, the CIMT provisions cannot be
said to meet due process requirements for noncitizens as required by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Expansion of the Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine Allows a New Challenge to CIMTs

The recent trio of Supreme Court decisions expanding the void-forvagueness doctrine may provide a new path forward for noncitizens to
challenge the CIMT provisions in the INA.
First, in Johnson, the Court opened the door for as-applied vagueness

340. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN
FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 680 (8th
ed. 2016) (quoting 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y.
WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05(1)(d)(i) (2015)).
341. 642 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir. 2011).
342. Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2020).
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challenges.343 Rather than needing to find a statute unconstitutionally
vague in all of its applications under a facial challenge, the Court in
Johnson reasoned that its prior decisions “squarely contradict the theory
that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some
conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”344 Therefore, the
CIMT provision can be challenged through individual as-applied
challenges to particular crimes, rather than requiring that a facial
challenge be brought to strike down the provisions in their entirety.
Additionally, the decision in Dimaya affirmed the Court’s willingness
to strike down a portion of the INA as unconstitutionally vague. This
bodes well for a challenge to the CIMT provisions in the INA because the
Court in Dimaya reasoned that “the most exacting vagueness standard
should apply in removal cases.”345
Lastly, the Court in Davis took issue with a categorical approach, which
is similar to the one employed in the CIMT analysis. The Davis majority
stated that “the imposition of criminal punishment can’t be made to
depend on a judge’s estimation of the degree of risk posed by a crime’s
imagined ‘ordinary case.’”346 The Silva-Trevino III two-step approach
requires judges to make a similar estimation of whether moral turpitude
necessarily inheres in a particular crime.
Other commentators have argued that the arbitrariness of the CIMT
analysis can be solved by applying a uniform test, suggesting either the
least-culpable conduct test or realistic probability test.347 However,
determining which test to use serves merely as a band-aid rather than
solving the actual vagueness issue in the CIMT analysis. The problem
with using categorical tests to determine whether certain crimes are
CIMTs is that they each “involve an equal amount of judicial probing to
detect the contours of the statute of conviction involved. Neither looks at
the actual facts of the underlying conviction—both are entirely
theoretical, based on imagined hypothetical fact patterns.”348 Employing
any categorical test to determine whether a certain crime involves moral
turpitude depends on the perspective and opinions of the judge. The judge
must decide either what conduct under the relevant statute has a “realistic

343. See Koh, Void for Vagueness, supra note 86, at 1152–53, 1179.
344. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 602 (2015).
345. Sessions v. Dimaya, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018).
346. United States v. Davis, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2326 (2019).
347. See, e.g., George, supra note 172, at 589–603 (suggesting that courts apply the least culpable
conduct test). But see Salem, supra note 149, at 247 (arguing that courts should apply the realistic
probability approach).
348. Kornegay & Lee, supra note 196, at 104.
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probability of being prosecuted”349 or what is the “minimum criminal
conduct necessary” to violate the statute.350 Under either test, the judge
must decide based on their own hypothetical configuration of the crime at
issue rather than the actual conduct of the noncitizen.
Moreover, judges have no guideposts to make these determinations
beyond the general understanding that certain crimes—crimes against
people, against property, and involving fraud—typically involve moral
turpitude.351 Without any clear boundaries for all other crimes, judges
must evaluate when conduct is so morally reprehensible that society
deems it as “inherently base, vile, or depraved.”352 This determination
involves a question of arbitrary line-drawing, which the Court held
violated the Due Process Clause in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis. Each
case took issue with the fact that the phrasing of the residual clauses forced
judges to make evaluations based on hypothetical scenarios.353
C.

A Narrow Reading of Jordan v. De George Permits a Vagueness
Challenge to CIMTs

While Jordan v. De George is still the controlling precedent for
vagueness challenges to CIMTs, it should be read narrowly. The Jordan
decision has long withstood the test of time among modern cases, but its
holding may not be as expansive as it is cited for.354 Although the Court
ruled only on the issue of whether conspiracy to defraud the United States
is a crime involving moral turpitude,355 this case has come to stand for the
proposition that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not
unconstitutionally vague as a whole.356 However, the majority explicitly
stated that, “[w]hatever else the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’
may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes
in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving
moral turpitude.”357 Therefore, if this decision is read narrowly, a new
349. Salem, supra note 149, at 236.
350. Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008).
351. See supra section IV.C.
352. Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 922 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wittgenstein v. INS, 124 F.3d
1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997)).
353. See supra section IV.C.
354. See Kornegay & Lee, supra note 196, at 99.
355. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 223–24 (1951).
356. See id. at 232; see, e.g., Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 1957) (stating that
the court is “bound by the language and reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court” in rejecting
the vagueness challenge to CIMTs, notwithstanding the concerns raised by the dissenting opinion in
that case).
357. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232.
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vagueness challenge may be permitted without having to overrule
Jordan.358
CONCLUSION
Much has changed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan v. De
George. The BIA created a framework in Silva-Trevino III that was meant
to help courts evaluate what crimes constitute crimes involving moral
turpitude; however, this framework did little to create uniform decisions.
Ultimately, the current CIMT framework violates both pillars of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine by failing to provide notice and allowing arbitrary
enforcement of the laws. As a result, each time a noncitizen appears before
a judge for their conduct to be evaluated under the CIMT analysis the
outcome is anything but certain.
Absent action by the Supreme Court to clarify the CIMT analysis,
judges will continue to reach conclusions based on their own ideas of
morally appropriate conduct, and noncitizens will be the ones to pay the
price. However, given the current state of the Silva-Trevino III framework
and the Court’s apparent willingness to expand the void-for-vagueness
doctrine in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis, a new vagueness challenge to
crimes involving moral turpitude may be available. This series of cases
can be used by noncitizens to show the Court’s skepticism about
categorical tests, while providing support for vagueness challenges made
to immigration statutes. Additionally, courts can be instructed to read
Jordan narrowly as only applying to fraud crimes, which will permit new
vagueness challenges without having to overrule past Supreme Court
precedent. It is necessary to revisit the vagueness challenge to CIMTs to
ensure that noncitizens are not removed from a place they have called
home for years or even decades based on what a judge personally believes
to be immoral conduct.

358. Overruling prior precedent is difficult to do given that, as of 2018, less than 2% of Supreme
Court decisions have been overturned, due, in part, to the doctrine of stare decisis. See Amanda
Shendruk, Fewer Than 2% of Supreme Court Rulings Are Ever Overturned, QUARTZ (May 22, 2019),
https://qz.com/1326096/despite-its-pending-hard-right-turn-the-supreme-court-is-unlikely-tooverturn-roe-vs-wade/ [https://perma.cc/LD9A-WHZC].
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